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Abstract 
The examination of now-abandoned behaviorist analysis of the concept of belief can bring 
to light defects in perspectives such as functionalism and physicalism that are still considered 
viable. Most theories have in common that they identify the holding of the belief that p by a 
subject S with some matter of fact in or about S that is distinct from and independent of /J. In 
the case of behaviorism it is easy to show that this feature of the theory generates incoherence in 
the first-person point of view since it gives footing to the possibility that S could correctly assert 
“I believe that p,” (that is, “I have the complex disposition the behaviorist theory identifies with 
holding the belief that p”) and at the same time deny that p is the case. Parallel incoherence 
can be developed in the context of other philosophically popular accounts of the nature of belief. 
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How did we ever come to use such an expression as “I believe...?” Did we at some time 
come to be aware of a phenomenon (of belief)? Did we observe ourselves and other people and 
so discover belief? 
Moore’s paradox can be put like this: the expression “I believe that this is the cast“ is used 
like the assertion “This is the case”; and yet the hypothesi.T that 1 believe this is the case 15 not 
used like the hypothesis that this is the case. 
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1. Preliminary 
I will not attempt a general evaluation of behaviorism here. I want to examine 
specific features of behaviorist thinking about belief for the light they shed on other 
philosophies of the mind. Consider, for the sake of argument, the analytic behaviorist’s 
understanding of the concept of belief. The thrust of behaviorism is anti-Cartesian. 
Believing is not a question of an inner reality in the believer. Rather, S’s state of belief 
that p is S’s possession of a complex disposition all of the manifestations of which are 
to be found in the publicly observable behavior of S. Behaviorism, thus understood, 
is essentially opposed to the idea of an inner mental realm to which the subject has a 
direct and unique access. Let us imagine that the detailed description of the disposition 
that is supposed to constitute S’s belief that p has been filled in, and let DSp abbreviate 
that completely specified disposition. In fact, in the heyday of behaviorism, talk about 
dispositions remained at a programmatic level. No detailed description of a disposition 
constituting a propositional attitude was ever achieved, and gradual appreciation that 
not a single spelled out disposition would ever be forthcoming was one of the reasons 
for the abandonment of the behaviorist project by the preponderance of philosophers. At 
present, I want to ignore this difficulty and imagine that it has been overcome somehow. 
2. The contrast between “I believe that p” and p itself 
There is a big difference between the assertion that S has the disposition DSp and 
the assertion of p. No one will quarrel with that observation. Let p be the proposition, 
“There is intelligent life elsewhere in our galaxy.” It is evident that to ascribe belief 
that p to S is not to assert that there is intelligent life elsewhere in our galaxy, nor to 
deny this, nor to express neutrality on this issue. It is, then, unsurprising that, if we 
ascribe the disposition DSp to S, we do not thereby express any stand on the issue “Is 
it the case that p?” 
If S asserts “I have DSp,” S says of himself exactly what another speaker Z would 
say in asserting “S has DSp.” The content and the truth-conditions for the first-person 
and third-person ascriptions of DSp to S are the same. The truth or falsity of p is not 
at issue in evaluating either assertion. Both speakers understand that what they assert 
is true, if it is, in virtue of something about S. Whether or not there is intelligent 
life elsewhere in our galaxy does not come into the evaluation of either Z’s assertion, 
“S has DSp” or S’s assertion “I have DSp”, at all. In case S is himself an ardent 
behaviorist and S ascribes DSp to himself with the understanding that DSp constitutes 
his state of belief that p, the distinctness and independence of “I have DSp” and p 
itself remains conspicuous and indisputable. 
In spite of the conspicuousness of this last point, it rapidly becomes a difficulty and a 
problematic issue, not merely for behaviorism, but, by analogy, for other philosophical 
proposals concerning the nature of belief. This difficulty is the main topic of the present 
discussion. In consequence, I will be patient in examining matters that seem to be too 
obvious to deserve any attention. 
3. How trouble arises here 
We are accepting the behaviorist theory for the sake of argument. The behaviorist 
thesis is that DSp constitutes S’s belief that p. Therefore. in asserting that hc has 
the disposition DSp (assuming that S himself understands the dispositional nature of 
bclicf) S is telling us that he believes that p. In telling us that hc believes that ;I. S 
lets us know- the stand that he takes concerning whether ,I? is or is not the case. Thcrc 
is no distinctlon (for our purposes) to bc drawn between 
1 bclie1.c that p. 
1 take the \iew that II is the case. 
1 am OF the opinion that p. 
On p. I lake the stand that it is true. 
1 think that p. 
And there arc many other formulas for getting across the same idea. We can say that all 
of these arc expressions of the belief that p, and each of them expresses the speaker’s 
stand on the proposition p. In contrast. “I have DSp” makes an assertion ~rho~rt th(, 
SJWI/CP~- and does not express a stand on the proposition I’. The behaviorist faccq t\vo 
assertions that S might make 
(A) i ha\re DSp 
an d 
(B ) I believe that !I. 
The bchaviorict proposes that, for speakers and auditors 
of the behaviorist analysis,’ (B) asserts just what (A) 
who appreciate the corrcctncss 
asserts. To say of any subicct 
’ Although ~hc phrase “behaviorist analysis” 1s standard m phllosophlcnl d~scuwon. the aaw~~o~, that 
~dcnt~fies S’s belief that p with the possession of the complex dispwitlon DSp cannot he thought of >I< dn 
“analysis” of that means an account of the meaning of hellef-statements in cxeryday use. Llkc ph!sical15t 
phllosophicnl proposals concerning the nature of belief such as functionahsm, beha\ iorism. were at artlculatccl 
and generally crccepted. would have to be regarded as a disco\ely ‘rnd not as a semantic thcw All lhc 
philoxq~hlcal theories hate the same status. in this respect. and all arc defcctlxc fol- tha1 reason T‘hc) 
all purport to I(lentify just c,hat It 1s about a believer S in \IITW of \\hlch It IS correct to srq 01 5 “S 
beiie>es that ,r_” Ordinary speakers are able to ascribe and rcpolt belxfs without understanding Ius1 \\ haI 
the underlying wnure of belief is. The “dcscriptlons” of the Stale of hellewng that p that ordmary spcakcr\ 
arc ahlc to _civc dcpcnd upon identifying such states of belief only \ia the proposltlon heliwcd 11 15 a\ 
though philosopher-s and pbychologists generate conjectures and attempt ~nbestigations mto the nature 0: tllc 
state of believing that 1~ uhile ordinar); speakers do not give this I>sue any thought at all. They rcl! NM A 
natural ahill& to speak about these psychological realities wthout knowing what is the underlying nal!~rc 01 
the things of u.hlch they speak without hesitation \l:e are supposed to assume that this ia not paratlox~cal 
or ~urprlsing. An ordinary scientifically uneducated speaker- can, for csamplc. I-rcogniLe wart\ and rcpw hl\ 
ox\n \~irts and wccc<sfully identify warts of others without havmg any Idea that Mans arc views colon~c~ 
i’h~losoph~cal thcorw nhout hclicfs and other mental poems. ;f they arc correct. \\ill stand to the Ircainle\ 
that they chnraclerlLe as articulations of the csscntial nature ot. reahties about whwh ordman speahcrs hale 
hccn ahic tcr speak 1n their fashion all along At the same ilme. th c assumption that one of these I\ a :wxxl 
~,WLIIII of helrct’ and IS kno\vn LO he a correct accwni by a wblect S, carrw clth it the a>umptlul: that. 
for wch a spwker a report 01 a particular dqwsition (OI- of a timcrional <taic~ uould be liirerchan~~;~hl~~ 
\\ Ith the repot? “I heheie that p.” Such XI informed speaker v.wld know that m asxertmg “I bel~c\c that 
i’” he I\ assertms the presence of the factor that makeq It correct lo <a? of him that he hehew\ illat :J. 
Ilamely. the prc\encc of the dlsposjtion DSp. or the presence timctwnal staw FSp. or the presence II! lhc 
nonphysical nnnd-state MSp. or whate\ er orher reall~y might hc pro\ idcd bq J thcorlst as clln\tilrlt:nil S’\ 
>tatc of hcllc\ 1,‘~ that p. 
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S, including oneself, that that subject has DSp is to say that that subject believes that 
p. If that is right, S could express himself by saying 
(C) I have DSp, that is, I believe that p. 
This proposal, and with it the whole behaviorist thesis, seems to be excluded from the 
outset by the fact that everyone, including S, knows that possession of DSp is one 
empirical matter of fact and p: “There is intelligent life elsewhere in our galaxy,” is 
another independent empirical matter of fact. If S happens to know that he possesses 
DSp, he is at liberty to assert this without adverting to the issue of the truth or falsehood 
of p at all. S’s grounds for making this assertion about his dispositions can be just the 
same as Z’s grounds for ascribing the disposition DSp to S. Like Z, S can have any 
view or none at all as to the truth of p, and yet be able to correctly assert that he has 
this disposition. No speaker asserting that S has DSp thereby expresses a stand on p. 
Every speaker knows what is required for “S has DSp” to be true and every speaker 
knows that the truth of p is irrelevant. But “I believe that p” certainly does express 
the speaker’s stand on p. Which is just the point of this statement. 
4. The pragmatics of “I believe that p” 
Perhaps this challenge can be answered. A sophisticated attitude toward “I believe 
that p” might show that the this formula is not exactly the first-person version of 
“S believes that p.” The actual use of the first-person formula, it is sometimes said, 
is governed by pragmatic considerations as a consequence of which it expresses the 
speaker’s stand on p, while neither the third-person statement “S believes that p” nor 
the first-person ascription of a disposition “I have DSp” expresses a stand on p. In 
consequence, were behaviorism correct, “S has DSp” would capture what “S believes 
that p” asserts, but “I have DSp” would fail to capture the pragmatic features of “I 
believe that p.” 
This proposed divergence between the first-person and the third-person belief 
statement commonly leaves the details of the pragmatic considerations rather murky. 
One relatively explicit and thus evaluable proposal is that “I believe that p”, though 
not an assertion of p, does carry with it, as a matter of pragmatics, the conversational 
implication that the speaker would assert that p in appropriate circumstances. If this 
were so, it could explain away the facts that I am presenting as a problem for be- 
haviorism because the assertion “I have DSp” does not carry any such conversational 
implication. S himself could understand that DSp constitutes his own belief that p 
and yet deny that his assertion “I have DSp” could be used in place of “I believe 
that p” because the latter carries a conversational implication that the former does 
not. 
There is an odd twist here. To say that S would assert that p in appropriate 
circumstances is itself to ascribe a disposition to S. Furthermore, quite apart from 
any consideration of the pragmatics of the first-person belief statement, we will ex- 
pect the disposition to assert that p to be part of the complex disposition DSp that 
A. W. Collins/Annals qf’ Pure und Applied Lqic~ 96 { 1999) 7.588 7’1 
behaviorists propose as constituting belief that p in the first place. What sort of behav- 
ior will a p-believer characteristically manifest? For one thing, believing that p, S will 
go around asserting p, and agreeing with assertions of p, and answering “It’s true“ 
to the question “p?” and so forth. So the disposition to this verbal behavior will bc 
included in DSp. Therefore, to the extent that it is plausible to agree that the speaker 
who says, “I believe that p” will assert that p (in specified circumstances), the very 
same disposition u~ill be carried by “I have DSp” as well. If this is so, the claim that 
“1 believe that p” carries this implication will not bc any reason for distinguishing its 
force from that of “I have DSp.” 
As a matter of fact, if “I believe that p” carries a conversational implication that the 
speaker would assert that p, that conversational implication would have to be cancc- 
lable. Uncancelable implications are entailments and are, u $mwtiori, not conversational. 
In contrast, if the implication to assert that p in appropriate circumstances is an element 
DSp then it cannot be cancelled since it is part of what we are assuming constitutes 
S’s belief that p. So, if there is a conversational, and hence cancelable, implication 
carried by “I believe that p” it cannot be identified with the uncancelable implication 
that comes with DSp. What could this further cancelable implication be’? And how 
can we assess the claim that it may signify a pragmatic component in the force of “I 
believe that p‘?” 
I think it helps to look at a related and less mysterious instance of conversational 
implicature that accompanies ordinary assertions. It is quite correct to say that the as- 
sertion p carries with it the conversational implication that the speaker believes that 
p. This is another way of pointing out that assertion is, in fact, the standard linguistic 
vehicle for expression of belief. All you have to do, ordinarily, in order to express 
the belief that p is assert p. As a conversational implication this is cancelable. It is 
cancelled, for example, in the following statement, “I have been asked to make the 
following announcement: p.” With this preface, S’s statement does not justify us in 
saying “S believes that p” while assertion of p without the preface does justify this 
ascription of belief that p to S. S does not indicate that he takes any stand one way 
or the other on p if he asserts that p merely in compliance with a request to make an 
announcement. 
Now, we can understand the foundation of the temptation to ascribe a con\-crsational 
implication to S when S asserts “1 believe that p”. The objective is to explain how 
these words do express the speaker’s stand on p itself. even though the mere possession 
of the disposition seems to be self-ascribable without saying that the belief is true. The 
alleged implication, it is hoped, will carry the commitment to p itself which does 
not seem to be carried by mere report of the state which constitutes the state of 
belief. This sounds attractive because, if S implies that he would assert p itself, he 
seems to bc saying that he would do so because that would express the stand on 
p that he fails to express in merely reporting the existence of the belief-constituting 
disposition. 
Unfortunately, it now emerges that even if he were to assert that p, S would only 
express his stand on p in virtue of the second conversational implication just considered 
to the effect that a speaker believes what he asserts. As we saw, this is a conversational 
implication of assertion and it can be cancelled. This means that the assertion of p 
without any conversational implication does not indicate that the speaker is committed 
to the truth of what he asserts. 
Ironically, things fall out in a way that is just the opposite from that proposed 
by a philosopher who sees a conversational implication in “I believe that p” to the 
effect that the speaker would also assert that p. This is supposed to assure us that 
the speaker expresses a stand on p itself, but actually, if S does assert p, it is only 
because he conversationally implies that he believes that p, that S will express a stand 
on p. The stand on p is expressed by the explicit force of “I believe that p” and that 
stand is also expressed by the assertion of p only because the proposition explicitly 
stating commitment to p is implied by assertion (as long as that implication is not 
cancelled). 
The fact that an alleged conversational implication carried by “I believe that p” could 
be cancelled, shows that the hopes pinned on such an implication are baseless. Just 
as a speaker agreeing to make an announcement might say “The following statement 
does not necessarily represent my opinion”, in order to cancel the implication that his 
statement is an expression of belief, so too the cancellation of the alleged implication 
of “I believe that p” to the effect that the speaker would assert that p is the case 
would amount to an explicit deletion of that customary implication. The result would 
be something with the force, 
I believe that p, but in this context I do not imply that I) is the case or that it is 
not the case or that I would express any stand on that issue. 
But this is the incoherence we are trying to avoid. This is not really surprising. Since 
it is the essence of “I believe that p” to express commitment to p, any understanding 
that dcletcs that is going to be incoherent. The idea that a pragmatic factor explains the 
expression of a stand on p goes wrong at the start by accepting the idea that a mere 
report of the existence of the speaker’s own state of belief is neutral on the question of 
the truth of the belief. Only this assumption, which is in fact incoherent, leads to the 
thought that “I believe that p” needs the reinforcement of a conversational implication 
if it is to convey the speaker’s stand on p. 
I cannot assert “1 believe that p” and explicitly disavow any stand on whether 
p is the case. If I disavow a stand, I disavow belief that y. If 1 refuse to address 
the issue of my stand on p itself, 1 refuse to say whether I believe that p or not. 
There is simply no work for a cancelable implication or any other pragmatic feature 
of the assertion here. Notice that, ;i‘~el- in~possihie there were an intelligible role for 
such an implication, then “I believe mat p” with the alleged implication cancelled, 
could, indeed, be “analyzed” in terms of DSp, or of another constitution for the state 
of believing that p. For the cancellation would say, in effect, “I believe that p, and 
do not mean this to indicate, as it usually does, that I take a particular stand on p 
itself.” The incoherence that attaches to the various philosophical theories of belief is 
unwittingly embraced by the thought that “1 be!ieve that p” needs a conversational 
implication to convey a stand on p. 
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5. A behaviorist’s response 
We have to say that “I believe that p” expresses the view that p is true, cvcn 
though “I believe that p” is only accounted false in case the speaker does not hold the 
belief. Is there something “tricky” going on here? Let us say that there is the supcrticial 
appearance of a problem. I want to show that this problem is not superficial and is 
not merely an appearance. We find here the usual subtlety and obscurity that attends 
first-person usage of psychological concepts, The complexities are not impenetrable and 
the implications for the philosophy of mind arc substantial. The apparent difhculty is 
as follows: 
(D) Behaviorism cannot be right because one can always rightly or wrongly assert 
that one has a certain disposition DSp without expressing a stand on p. while one 
cannot assert “1 believe that p” without expressing the stand that p is the case. 
The rebuttal of (D) will have to take one or the other of two forms: 
(Rl) It may be claimed that “I have DSp” can express the speaker’s stand on the 
proposition y and that, in consequence, this formula can dcsewe the gloss “I believe 
that p.” 
(R2) It may be claimed that (C) is coherent and “1 have DSp” can deserve the 
gloss “I believe that y” even though the speaker does not express a stand on the 
proposition p using these words. 
The success of (Rl) would require us to understand that “1 have DSp” can express the 
speaker’s stand on p, namely, S’s view that y is the case. But how could we reach 
that understanding? Imagine that I tell you about some disposition that is manifested 
in my behavior: 
In such and such circumstances I behave in so and so manner. 
Let this disposition be as complicated as you please, and, in particular, let it include 
circumstances in which I manifest verbal behavior. As WC have already noted. the 
behaviorist’s idea is that, a believer that p behaves in ways that one would expect 
from a subject who takes it that p is true, and that includes assertion of p and of 
“I believe that p” and so on, when such a verbal performance is called for. unless 
mitigating circumstances account for the suppression of these assertions. E\,en if the 
strands of the disposition include a disposition to assert y in specified circumstances. 
the claim to have the disposition is not an assertion of p and is compatible with the 
falsehood of p. If I explicitly state that I am disposed to assert p, that does not entail 
that, in self-ascribing the disposition, I do assert y. 
If intuition needs prompting here, we might note that, having stated that I am dis- 
posed to assert that p, I may be asked why I do assert that y in the specified circum- 
stances. Among feasible responses we can find “I really don’t know. Something comes 
over me.” or “I guess I just think that’s what people want me to say. It’s a neurotic 
weakness.” These replies make it clear that in self-ascribing a disposition to assert p 
I need not be expressing the view that p is the case and I may know and state that p 
is false. 
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But suppose, given the actual spelling out of DSp, imagination failed us and we 
couldn’t think of any plausible circumstances under which a person who self-ascribes 
that disposition could intelligibly deny that p. Maybe some disposition is a fail-safe 
sign that the subject reporting it will not only assert that p, but will also mean it. A 
behaviorist might then be justified in claiming that this spelling-out of DSp makes it 
an utterly reliable indication that the possessor of the disposition does take the stand 
that p is true. The point is that, even if there were such a spelling-out of a disposition, 
the self-ascription of DSp could not be itself an expression of the view that p is the 
case. 3 This outcome leads us naturally to the second line of thinking (R2) by means 
of which it might be expected that the tricky-sounding difficulty (D) can be resolved. 
(R2) can be developed as a harsh challenge to the line of thinking by means of which 
we have presumed to find a global problem for the behaviorist. Just what should be 
understood under the heading 
S expresses a stand on p? 
The difficulty expressed in (D) and the appearance of a puzzle about behaviorism 
is generated by shifting between two quite different things that might be meant by the 
words “Expresses a stand on p. ” “I believe that p” certainly does express the idea 
that the speaker takes the stand that p is the case. It lets auditors know that this is 
3 That “I have DSp” can, in no circumstance, be taken for an expression of a stand on p itself is made 
fairly clear in Gilbert’s Ryle’s version of the dispositional theory. Ryle steadfastly opposes the idea of a 
privileged access to one’s own beliefs: intentions, fears and the like, and he presents the following view of 
a subject’s knowledge of his own psychological states: 
on the account of self-knowledge that I shall give, knowledge of what there is to be known about 
other people is restored to approximate parity with self-knowledge. The sorts of things I can find out 
about myself are the same as the sorts of things I can find out about other people, and the methods of 
finding them out are much the same. A residual difference in the supplies of the requisite data makes 
some differences in degree between what I can know about myself and what I can know about you, but 
these differences are not all in favor of self-knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is easier 
for me to find out what I want to know about you than it is for me to find out the same sort of things 
about myself. In certain other important respects it is harder. But in principle, as distinct from practice, 
John Doe’s ways of finding out about John Doe are the same as John Doe’s ways of finding out 
about Richard Roe. To drop the hope of Privileged Access is also to drop the fear of epistemological 
isolationism; we lose the bitters with the sweets of Solipsism. (The Concept of Mind, London, 1949, 
p. 155-156.) 
In general, the respect in which it is easier for a subject to find out about his own beliefs is that S is 
present for, and thus a potential observer of, every instance of S’s behavior. The whole body of evidence 
for S’s dispositions is accessible to S, while another person, Z, is inevitably an episodic observer of S and 
an intermittent gatherer of evidence concerning S’s dispositions. Of course, S may pay no attention to some 
manifestations of his own dispositions even though he is present for them all and, in some cases, Z may be 
a more attentive observer of S’s behavior and a better, more objective judge of S’s dispositions than S is. In 
this statement of the symmetry of the first-person and the third-person ascription of belief and other mental 
states, Ryle makes it clear that he does not think of the first-person self-ascription of what S “finds out about 
himself’ as an expression of a stand on the proposition p. What S will find out is what he is disposed to 
do and say in various circumstances and the result of this investigation, however successful it may be, will 
no more amount to the expression of a stand on p. than Z’s ascription of the very same disposition to S, 
found out by Z’s recourse to the very same matters to which S adverts, will amount to an expression of a 
stand on p. 
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the stand that S takes on p. But there is a sense in which “I believe...” only asserts 
that this is the speaker’s stand, and does not assert the proposition that S might assert 
because of the stand he takes. To express the stand that he takes on p, S would have 
to assert that p. S is not strictly doing that in merely telling us that he takes the stand 
he does. 
As a solution for the problem (D), (R2) will find support. For the critique of be- 
haviorism articulated in (D) will apply with the very same force to most of the other 
theories about the nature of belief currently espoused by philosophers of mind. These 
theories differ from behaviorism in that many of them do not reject the idea that beliefs 
and other mental states are inner realities in subjects. Popular philosophies of mind arc 
Cartesian in this respect although most of them differ from Descartes in proposing a 
material rather than a spiritual constitution for inner mental realities, and many reject a 
Cartesian presumption of infallibility on the part of subjects in apprehending their own 
mental states. Apart from these differences, materialist theories about belief and func- 
tionalist theories, that identify S’s believing with causally defined and neurally rcalizcd 
states of the believer, have salient features in common with behaviorism. In particular, 
all such theories identify the state of believing in some way that will make it possi- 
ble to report the existence of that relevant reality in the believer without expressing a 
stand on the truth or falsehood of p. A moment’s refection will make it obvious that. 
whatever the particular theory of the nature of inner states of belief, the presence of 
such a state in S will be an empirical matter of fact distinct from and independent of 
the truth of y. If this feature of the behaviorist account is itself a decisive defect, the 
other theories will have a parallel and equally decisive defect, and their repudiation 
of behaviorist reduction to dispositions and of Cartesian spiritualism and incorrigibility 
will not insulate them from the difficulty (D). 
Another way of stating this relationship between behaviorism and other theories 
about the nature of belief is more illuminating. We might well ask, How did it come 
about that behaviorists offered an account of belief in terms of a gloss for “I believe 
that p” that makes this a factual statement about the speaker that fails to express any 
stand on p? Why did behaviorists think this understanding of “I believe that p“ could 
possibly succeed? The answer is that behaviorism was presented as a metaphysically 
conservative response to dualistic, or Cartesian conceptions of belief and other mental 
realities. For the Cartesian, “I believe that p” reports an inner mental reality to which 
the speaker has a unique access. So, for the dualist with his adventurous ontology of 
non-physical substance and his egocentric epistemology, “I believe that p” is not an 
expression of the speaker’s stand on ~7. The speaker is not supposed to be saying any- 
thing like “I assign the truth-value T to p.” For his “I believe that p“ has other matters 
to convey, namely the presence of an inner non-physical reality. So behaviorism merely 
follows the pattern of the prevailing dualist thinking in so far as it offers a proposition 
quite other than and independent of I? as the assertive force of “I believe that p.” In 
just the same way, all the physicalist theories about belief feel no special obligation 
to include something like an assertion of p itself in their interpretation of “I believe 
that p” because the familiar mentalistic theories which physicalism tries to replace 
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have themselves offered just such an independent subject matter for “I believe that 
p.” Other theories like behaviorism and physicalism differ from mentalism essentially 
about the nature of the independent subject matter offered in interpreting “I believe that 
p.” They all accept from a shared background paradigm the idea that a factual subject 
matter for “I believe that p” distinct from the subject matter of p can be and ought 
to be provided. This shared commitment comes from Cartesian thinking. All of these 
opponents of Cartesian philosophy of mind imagine that the trouble with Cartesianism 
lies in the spurious non-physical constitution it proposes for states of belief and other 
mental realities. They all share with Cartesian thinking the assumption that states of 
belief must be reportable items of some kind that will furnish a distinctive subject 
matter for belief statements in both the first person and the third person. 
6. The central issue 
The gist of (R2) as a proposed solution of (D) is that, when properly understood, “I 
believe that p” does not express the speaker’s stand p although it indicates what the 
speaker’s stand is. Thus, according to (R2), there is no conceptual defect in proposing 
that the belief that p be constituted by this disposition. If behaviorism is defective, 
it is because beliefs are not constituted by the dispositions of believers, but in some 
other way. The short version of the solution of (D) offered by (R2) is as follows: 
“I believe that p” says what stand the speaker takes a on p but does not express 
the stand that the speaker takes. “I believe that p” is, thus, a feasible gloss for “I 
have DSp” and (C) is coherent. 
(R2) depends on a distinction between S’s assertion of his stand on p, and S’s assertion 
that he takes the stand that he does on p. If (D) is not successfully rebutted by (R2) 
it is because this distinction cannot be sustained. This is the crux issue to which we 
must now address ourselves. If (R2) were correct, in the absence of any philosophical 
theory about belief, S could make the status of his assertion “I believe that p” clear 
by emphasizing the scope of his report on his state as follows: 
(E) I believe that p. In making this assertion, I report a stand I take. That I take 
this stand is the proposition I assert, call it q, Whether p is true or false is another 
question on which I am, so far, silent. 
For (R2) the feasibility of (E) is not itself a behaviorist claim or part of any philo- 
sophical theory. It is a proposed preliminary understanding of ordinary speech. But it 
is absolutely required for any of the philosophical theories. The philosophical proposals 
that belief-states are dispositions, or neural realities, or spiritual goings-on, presuppose 
this understanding because each of the theories will generate a sentence that purports to 
articulate just what it is about S that makes his report on his own state a true assertion. 
When this is made explicit, the shortfall of (R2) comes into view. S cannot make 
the proposed statement (E). If he were to try, S would be revealing that he stands 
to be wrong if q is false, and right if q is true, but, identifying his assertion as he 
does, he is expressly denying that it reveals any risk of error about p itself. But this 
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epistett?ic tG2 concerning p cannot be detached from “I believe t p.” We said that S 
is not asserting that p in asserting “I believe that p.‘” This is the first part of (R2) and 
it can be accepted. It remains the case that in asserting “I believe that p” S is saying 
that he is mistaken about p if p is false. This is not conveyed if S merely makes 
another assertion q. 
If S merely states a fact about himself and is. so far. silent concerning p itself, 
wc could appropriately ask him to go on, beyond self-ascription, to address p itself, 
and to advise us of his views on that matter of fact. But S cannot be asked this. and 
cannot advance to the consideration of p itself, because his “I believe that p” has 
already stated that he is mistaken if p is false and right if p is true. If wc accept his 
assertion. “I believe that p,” there is nothing left to find out by asking S to address /r 
itself. 
7. What “I believe that p” does assert 
Theorists all assume that some q or other with the form “S’s state of believing that 
I_’ is actually constituted by . ..” is correct and that the first-person assertion of such 
a q will be at no greater distance from assertion of p than “I believe that p”. For, 
like all candidates for q, “1 believe that p” can be true whether or not p is true. This 
understandable assumption engenders defective philosophy of mind. 
The significance of “I believe that p” can be approached by thinking about the actual 
circumstances in which this form of words is likely to be selected by a speaker. We 
have noticed that these words, like assertion of p, convey the idea that the speaker 
is mistaken in case p is false. We said that the simple unprefaced assertion of ,D is 
the standard linguistic vehicle for expression of belief that /-7. When S asserts that ~1 
in explanation or justification of an action, his auditors will take it for granted that 
the assertion is an expression of belief. Similarly, if S endorses the proposition r on 
the ground that it is a deductive consequence of p (perhaps with other premises). S’s 
assertion of p as a premise is taken as an expression of belief that p. On the other 
hand, when S does express his belief that p using the prefacing phrase, “I believe 
that p” the environment of potential discourse is much the same as it would be if S 
had asserted that p. We expect S to infer from “I believe that p” and premisscs K. 
just what S would infer from premisses p and K. If S has said “I believe that y” 
and is challenged with “Why do you say that? What makes you think so?” intelligible 
responses by S will be matters that support p, just as if S had asserted that ,D. We 
have only marginal use for an interpretation of “What makes you think so?“ or “How 
do you know?” that takes these questions to mean “How do you know or what makes 
you think that JYIU believe that p. 3” In contrast all parties expect that the speaker who 
asserts “1 believe that p” will interpret “What makes you think so?” to mean “What 
support for p itself do you have?” 
Challenges that require a believer to address the issue, “What support for p do you 
have?” cannot simply be set aside. At most, S can provide disappointing defenses for 
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the endorsement of p such as “There is nothing I can put into words. I guess it is just 
a hunch.” The following is not admissible: 
I know of nothing at all that makes p seem to be true, or plausible, or more 
credible than up. I am not saying that p is the case. I say merely that I believe 
that p. 
This remark would have to be, at most, unexpected if believing were a disposition, or 
a functional state, or an introspectible item. The point here is exhibited in the fact that 
we cannot believe that p at will, or in obedience to a command. We cannot be forced 
to believe that p by threats, nor corruptly induced to believe that p with bribes. This 
should give us pause in thinking about the philosophical theories. Since DSp does not 
require that p be true it could be possible to acquire the disposition at will or for 
a financial consideration. It could be possible to implant a neural state in one’s own 
brain. Then the curious question would arise “Could S demand to be paid an agreed 
upon sum for believing that p on the ground that he had implanted the appropriate 
neural state in his own brain?” An intuition surely encourages us to say that this is, 
after all, possible. For a neural state could induce the feeling of conviction that p is 
that case and it might cause all of the behavior expected of a believer. This intuitive 
support is cancelled at once when we suppose that S might know that his own feeling 
of conviction and the pattern of his own behavior are a consequence of the implanting 
of a neural state and have nothing whatever to do with the truth of p. Then S would 
properly say, 
“When I think about p, I get a sort of feeling of assent or a sense of confident 
conviction, and I tend to tell others that p is so spontaneously, and I behave in 
any number of associated ways, although I fully understand that all this is simply 
generated by the neural state and whether p is true or false has nothing to do 
with it.” 
Confronted with this stance, we will conclude that S recognizes that his own “symp- 
toms” of belief give a misleading impression because he is able to separate all of these 
symptoms from the idea that p is the case. Once S discounts all of these appear- 
ances of belief, the question “Do you have any (undiscounted) support for p?" will 
be pertinent, and if S’s answer is negative, if he does not even claim that he has a 
hunch that p is the case, we will not say that S believes that p even though he has 
implanted a neural item that makes him resemble a person who believes that p. This 
suffices to show that that neural state cannot be said to constitute S’s belief that p 
under any circumstances. If, for some reason, S cannot know about the implanting and 
cannot discount the appearances, that circumstance will not yield a scenario in which S 
actually believes that p. We can imagine, for instance that the neural state S implants 
causes total forgetting of the fact that it has been implanted and even comes with a 
plausible story that S can tell, and appropriate representations with which S answers 
requests for his support for p. Under these circumstances, we should say that S will 
think that he believes that p. S will have the mistaken impression that he has support 
for p which he is able to formulate. But this is not the same thing as believing that 
p. The case where S does know about the implanting shows us this. The mere fact 
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that if he did know that the implanting S would not claim to have support for p and 
would discount all of the relevant behavior indicates that belief requires actual reasons 
and not merely the impression that one has reasons. 
This excursion into the fantasy of implanted neural states merely reinforces the gen- 
eral point that is captured by (D). An implanted neural state cannot be the subject’s 
belief that p because S can recognize that he might have no reason for endorsing p 
even though the state is present. and he reports “I believe that p” only because he 
takes himself to have support for p. The mere manifestations of the implanted state 
will all be discounted if it is appreciated that the state has been arbitrarily implanted. S 
will understand this. S’s “I believe that p” will be withdrawn in case he discounts the 
appearances of his own support for p. Belief is a kind of engagement with the world. 
We can imagine cases where S and everyone else might take ir for granted that S 
believes that p when he does not. The implanted neural state is a case in point. In this 
respect, belief is rather like perception. If a subject appreciates that he hallucinates, hc 
withdraws the claim to perceive. This is very different from appreciation of the possi- 
bility of subjective and deforming elements in one’s perception. “It looked X to me, 
while I now know that it was really Y” does not report an hallucination. So the thought 
that a belief may be false is not the thought that it may not be an engagement with 
the world at all. If I do have a belief 1 will have actual reasons for it, and not just the 
illusion of reasons. They may be inadequate reasons and based on misinterpretations. 
Then the beliefs may be false beliefs. But if I do not engage the world at all, even 
though I act and speak just as though I believe that p, I do not so believe. 
Given that S’s “I believe that p” will generate the expectation that S can support the 
proposition p itself, we may ask what motivates the choice of the preface “1 bclievc 
that...?” when simple assertion of p would also express the speaker’s belief that /I, 
For the most part, a speaker says “I believe that” precisely in order to emphasize the 
non-negligible possibility of error which might not be appreciated if he merely asserted 
p. If S is absolutely sure that p. it would ordinarily be quite misleading for him to 
assert “I believe that p” because those words would create the impression that S has 
reservations or is mindful of the possibility of error when he has no such reservations 
and is not worried that he might be mistaken. Idiomatic cases where speakers do 
express non-existent doubts by using the prefacing “I believe that” help us to see that 
the registration of a measure of uncertainty is a normal function for this prcfacc. For 
example, if Z asserts, “As Pythagoras said, Man is the measure of all things,” S might 
offer the polite correction, “I believe that was Protagoras.” Although Z knows that 
it was Protagoras. his “I believe that p” falsely and, thus with a kind of formulaic 
courtesy, implies that he has doubts so that Z’s mistake will not be an occasion for 
embarrassment. 
In short, the introductory phrase “I believe that” is not selected in preference to 
simple assertion of p in order to mark S’s speech act as an expression of belief. No 
such mark is needed. “I believe” often serves to indicate that the speaker may be 
mistaken in endorsing p and thus as a warning lest auditors take S’s expression of 
belief as a sufficient reason for assuming that p is the case. “1 believe that p” differs 
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from assertion of p in that it canvases in advance the possibility that the speaker may 
be mistaken in endorsing the proposition p. Of course, the use of the phrase is not 
needed in the sense that, were S to express his belief by asserting p, he would incur 
just the same risk of being mistaken about p. So the selection of the phrase is a rough 
mark of the speaker’s assessment of the chances of being mistaken. 
This possibility of anticipating and drawing attention to the possibility of one’s own 
error is made explicit in other idiomatic vehicles for expression of belief that p such as 
Unless I am mistaken, p 
and 
p, or I am much mistaken. 
These formulas help us to understand the truth-value distributions that are possible 
for p and “I believe that p." For these forms of words have the feature that, since 
they expressly disjoin the possibility that the speaker is mistaken with the assertion of 
p, the whole assertion can be true even if p is false. For if p is false, the speaker 
is mistaken and the disjunction is true. But this surviving truth does not indicate a 
further matter of fact, distinct from and independent of p, that S correctly reports in 
saying “Unless I am mistaken, p." If p is false, his words express the mistake that S 
is making. The subject matter remains just p, and it is precisely because he is wrong 
about that subject matter that the complex form of words is true. The truth-values that 
are appropriate for “I believe that p" follow just this pattern. “I believe that p" is true, 
when p is false, because it expresses the mistake that S makes in endorsing p itself. 
So asserting “I believe that p" entails, as we said above, that the believer is mistaken 
about p in case p is false. S runs this risk only by addressing the proposition p and 
making a determination on that issue. An assertion by S of q, where q expresses any 
other factual matter distinct from and independent of p, will not convey S’s risk of 
error in case p is false. Although, “I believe that p" does not assert p, it does express 
S’s endorsement of p and, at the same time, registers the thought that, in that very 
endorsement, S may be making a mistake. S cannot communicate this by making an 
assertion about some other matter fact. Therefore, the difficulty (D) cannot be overcome 
and theories that offer a matter of fact independent of p that S might report and then 
gloss saying “In other words, I believe that p" will fail. All the familiar philosophies 
of mind fall into this class. 
